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NEAR EAST CONFLICTS
TH E prlJhlt'll1~ !'t''''ult illg in the lli'll'lof'nth('1'lllury from t.hl' ur('llk.u/J uf the TurkishEllfpirc's position in the Balkl\u al't~
pl\mlleled in the twentieth century by
t llc trou blt>s arisillg from t,he demolition of
Turkish rule ill the Ncar Ea..'!t during the Grcat
War. Originally. Rritain had hoped to inherit
nil Near Eastel'll possessiollR of the Ottoman
1':01 pire outside of Turkey pl'Opcr. But in the
~ykes.Picot Agreement (May H 'W, 191G) Brit·
Hin-mo. t n:luctant 1~'-prol1lillerl part. of them
t.o Franco. After Ul(' war, Syria, which had
formed an entity n.8 long as it wns under Turkish
rule, was split up into thc Lebanon, Syria,
Pall'stine, and Tran jordania. The promised
indepenllenee was diluted to mandates. with
"'ranee be ollling the mandatory powl'r of the
former two. Rritain of tbe lat.ter two. London
was not v ry pl<'ll.;cd with this situation and
pulled tb(' strings of some of the rebt.-llions
against the I-'rench whieh the laU,er had to
(Juell by force.
TilE I.RllAXOX
The collapse of her ally ill 1!J40 gave Brita,in
a chance to unhinge the Frenoh position in the
Levant. By means of the Syrian campaign
c rried out in 1941 with t.he support of De
(Jaunist forces against the French forces loyal
to Marshal Petain. Britain gaine<! control in
t hat area. The Brit,ish aM well as De Gaulle
promiBed independ nee to Syria and the Leb·
nnon: the BritiRh !>ceaullo they hoped to
undermine the French posit.ion and pave the
WilY for the incorporation of these countri£'s in
Il Pan-Arabian federation of British conception,
De Gaulle because he wished to gain the l:IUppon
of the population of these countries and alienate
it from the Vichy Government, while stiJI
retaining the French mandate. The rC8uJt
"'88 a Ia.tent conflict over the interpretation of
the independence to be granted. Egged on by
the Briti8h, the LeblLnese Government proposed
in November 1943 to abrogate the constitution
-which had been impoS('t1 by the French-as
inconsistent with t.he statUi! of an independent
state. This step wu.s Iluswercd by the ,[4'renoh
High Commissionur with the arrest of the
President and '·he members of the Government
lind Parliament of LeblLlloll. London Wl\ll now
in a position to play its favorite part of "pro-
tector of the weak" and presscd De GlLUUe, at
t,hat time still in Algi 'rd, to make concessions
.and reinstate the urre!ltetl L.ebanc.<>e leaders.
Although temporarily allayed, t.he problem was
.Mot solved.
The :<11 rC':ol t qllt'"tinn is that of fI Lehnne!le
arnJ\'. The Lebane"c G,Wf'rnlllC'nt c1aimll that
tlwl''c call he no q llcstioll of imJepenu£'nce lUllellll
the country has an army of its own. De Gaulle'll
reluctance to grant this request led to serioll8
tension early this year, accompanied by wide·
spreatl dcmonstrations on the part of the
population. The most interesting aspect of
this contlict was London's unfavorable reaction
when De Gaulle declared that France refused
to abdicate {rom hcr position of predomimwcc
in the Levant.
Having concluclod his pact with Stalin, De
Gaulle wants Franc~e to act the part of a great,
power in tbe Kear "'~o..'1t, too. WhiJe eompelJed
during his period of exile to concede independ·
ence to Lebanon and Syria, he must now 1'0,
a...."ert hi.'i authority by force.
TWO SEW<.:OMERS, TWO OLDTI~ERS
Yet it is not the French that the British are
worr),jng about. There are other, heavier
baUl! J)owuillg Street mUlit juggle with. In
contrast to the period foUowing upon tho Great
War, whcn she WlUl the lUHl.isputed milltre88 of
the Mediterranean, England ill now 011 the
defensive in the Near Ea.'!t. At that' time
there W~ only France in the running, while
Italv WI\." exhausted and t.he Soviet Union 8.
field for foreign intervention. Today Britain is
the weakest of tho Big Three, and the two
giants to whom she is allied are clUlting covetous
glances at the Nellr Eu.st. Both thc USA anel
the USSR £'njoy the advantage of being at
liberty to pursue &n opportunL'.It policy; for
them it is not, as for Britain. a question of
existence, but of more power.
Anot.ht"r problem to worry J~ritain is tbe
antagonism hetween Araha and .'cws. III order
to win the Arah!< for her own l'nds. England
hll8 supported their aspirations for & Pan-
Ara.bian federation. This movement gained
momentum after it.s first conference in Alexan·
{tria in Octoner JH4-4 and is vehNKently oppo,.oo
to Jewish immi~ratioll into Pa:E'stine and any
formation of an alien state on Arab soil. At
the same time. thfl hands of tho British arc tied
hy the Balfour Declara.tion of 1917 I which
pronUsed the Jews a "national homc" in Pale...·
tine. They canoot disavow it unless t.hey ure
prepared to lose .Jewish support. The restraint
with which the assassination of Lord Moyne
by Jewish terrorists (fU 1.44) was handled was
symptomatic of Britain's caution. In the past,
the Jewi. h·Arabian antagonism served to 811S-
tain British rule and influence, just 8.8 that
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between Hindus and MohammeUlI.n!l did in
Indill. The growth of the Pan-Arabian spirit
has. however. stimulated 1\ nationalism which
may become 108s tractahle or be exploited by
another of thE' competing poweN. Tbu" Britain
may be compelled to "ido with one of the two
lIntagonigts, and this WIUl indeed suggested
recently by General Spears, MP and until reo
cently British Minister to Sy~iaand the Lcb~noD,
who advocated greater consideration of the
Arab point of view:
The qUelItion of PalOlltine is of major import6Dee
to the Arabs, who c!ontest the right of Jewa to
their land, aad "their" land is any of the vast tor-
ritoriea inhabited by llO,OOO,OOO Arabs.
And if "'e rat-! our eyebrows at this, would not
tho Arab lL~k (&.\I he dOOll ask) what would our attitude
be if the position wero rovoraed! Supposing an out·
llido authority decided that an unlimited number of
Araha be settled in ClUlada, would there be no agi....
tion in Britair! Would not evon the United States,
apparently IIUch ardont Zionists today. wonder wheth·
er unlimited immigration might not affect them!
Would they throw open their frontiers to str&ngel'8!
OIL AND DIJ'LOMATS
The USA is probably a le.s.s dangerous rival
for Rritain than the USSR. Apart {rom the
distance separating America from thc Near
1'~lUlt, Roosevelt's championing of the Zionist
cause conUicts with the American IUlpirat·ions
for oil, which can only be ohtaineu by co-
operation with the Arabs. TIle business in-
terests of the big American oil concern" do not.
always tally with Government inteN'st~, one of
",",veraI reasons why the grandiose lr)()-miHion
Iiollar pipe-line Ilcheme, the S<.'nslltion of early
I\l44. was ..helved. The dang~rou'.l proximity
of the Soviet. TJnion may 80180 commend an
Anglo·American understanrling to Washington.
Churchill's and RooRevelt's visit to the Near
l'~ast after the Yalta Conf~rence seem to sug-
~e!lt an understanding of that kind. The
negotiations pursued there with the Kings of
I':gypt and Saudi-Arabia, the Negus, and the
I'resident of Syria, indicate that Britain is
I)repared to admit the USA as a junior
partner in till' fostering of a British-controlled
Pan·Ar:lbian federation, l''''ranoo being excluded
n!together. Thill ill a partial explanation for
De HauUe's refu8lI1 to meet President Roose-
vdt in Algiers. How far the USA will back
the. phms of Downing Street, remains to be
>lCen. Howevcr, Anglo-American co-operation
hlUl already resulted in declarations of war
agailll>t, Oormany a.nd Japan on the part of
~evl'rul Ncar E8<!tern eountrir'B whieh wish
to aJ<llure themseh'es of admis!lion tickl'ts to
t11P. forthcomillg SI~n FranC'igco conference.
America hus, of course, not been idle in
",ceking her own advantages. In the competi-
tion for the Near East<>rn oil fieldR, hf'r holdings
have risen from some 15 rer cent in 1939 to
about :15 to .w per cent in 1944; she has a.ltto
pushed the eonstruction of airfields in prepara-
tion for po~twAr air·line competition.
A ISRtiog u.ccoru between England and the
USSR can hardly he visualized. The Ncar
East lic~ right in front of the Sovif't Union, '"
~ateway to the Mediterranean and the Indian
Ocean, to Africa and India. The Kremlin's
participation in the scramble for Iranian and
Arabian oil is only CIne move in a gt'f'stRr game,
not an end in itself all in the case of the USA.
Otht"r movf'S are the rpcent riispat.ch oC diplo.
matic and consllla,r representatives, many of
them Mohammedans. to Egypt, Syria, the J.eb-
anon, Iraq, and Palestine; the incl'e&'led
activity of the Soviet EmblUlsy in Tehernn-
whose pel'8Onuel now exceeds 200-and in
Cairo, whe.re a Sonet military mission for the
Near East hM made itl'l headf{uart,erfl; the in-
ception of broadcl\8ts in Arabic from Moscow
in June of IlUlt year; the purchase of Suez Canal
shares; the pilgrimage of Mohammedans from
the USSR to Mecca; the support ginn to De
Gaulle; the bu.cking of Communist parties; the
interference in the internal affairs of Iran; and
thp advance toward th<; MeUiterranel\n via the
Balka·ns.
Greece has provided Br~tain with l\ bitter
t·l\S~ of what she may expect along her life linl'l
to the Indian Ocean. Ninety year!C ago, E~.
land W3;' in l\ position t,o forge a mighty coalit·ioll
aga.inst an expanding Russia and to curb ber
by a concerted attack during the Crimean War.
Who will now !ltand by Britain in her defense
against tho aggressive USSR, which need not
weigh political, military. economic, and other
considerations as eautiouslv 88 Britain must in
view of tho complicatt.'d itructure of her Em·
pire!
Complll't"d to this great struggle of the giants,
which has yet to reach it,s climax, th~ pl'ellent
dispute between De Gaulle and the Levantine
states is only n. side show, hl1t one which i!l
causing apprehension in England. General
Spears put it !'quardy when he said in London
the other day: .• It is greatly to be feared that.
the French, having embarked on a policy o~
iU-disgui<;oo pre~l!ure, will pursue thn.t course.
If t.h('y do, it is 'highly probableo that the whole
Middle EMt will be aftBme. In that. di~a8troup.
l'ventuality it. is not, the Fren<,h who will suffer
most. They will merely lose finally wlint they
have half lost alread,\"; but British prestire will
suffer a c1isa!'ltrou8 setback, and our position in
an area vital to us will be in jeopllrdy:'
